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Mclntyre vs. Agricul. Bank, 1 Freem. Ch. R. 105; 1 Johns.
Cas. 160; 4 Kent's Com. 159, 160; 8 Stew. & 'Port. 408. Further as to nature of the trust: Harrison vs. Battle, 1 Dev. Eq.
541; Leonard vs. Ford, 8 Ire. (Law) 418; Jenks vs. Alexander,
11 Paige 619, 624.
In our next we propose to consider the mode of executing the
power; and herein of notices of sale; when equity will enjoin
and when set aside sales; effect of sales in barring equity of redemption and cutting off subsequent lienholders; trustee's deed;
of the right to the surplus, &c., &c.
J. F. D.
Davenport, Iowa.

RECENT AMERICAN

DECISIONS.

MOSES WELLS VS. SOMERSET & KENNEBEC RAILROAD COMPANY.
It is provided by 5, c. 81, of R. S. of 1840, that in locating railroads, "no
corporation shall take any meeting-house, dwelling-house, or public or private
burying-ground, without the consent of the ownera thereof." Held, that the
term dwelling-house, as here used, means only the house, and includes no part
of the garden, orchard, or curtilage.
The right of eminent domain confers upon the Legislature authority to take private property for public uses, when the public exigencies require it, subject
only to that provision of our Constitution which exacts just compensation; and
a dwelling-house is no more exempt than any other species of real estate, when
the Legislature, in the exercise of that right, determines that the public exigencies require it.

Exceptions from the ruling of RIOE, J. ; also, on motion-of defendants to set aside the verdict.
This was an action of the case for entering the plaintiff's close
and erecting thereon a bridge. The various questions of law, upon
3d. That a mortgagee or trustee may vote if actually in possessionfor thfe requiite period, but not otherwise: Appendix to 5 Ired. Eq.
Tested by ancient common law principles, this decision was undoubtedly right.
Kent's criticism of Judge TnowBRIDGE's doctrines on mortgages would apply to it.j
"It is in the rear of the improvements of the age in this branch of science; it is
an affront to common sense to hold that the mortgagor, even of a freehold interest,
is not the real owner :" 4 Com. 195.
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which the Judge at Nisi Priusgave instructions to the jury, were
argued by
Bradbury, 3orrill & Meserve, for the defendants, and by
J. Baker, for the plaintiff.
It was contended by the counsel for the plaintiff, that the instruction that the defendants could not so locate upon the plaintiff's
land connected with his dwelling-house as necessarily to deprive him
of the reasonable use thereof as a dwelling-house, was correct. It
was a necessary part of the dwelling-house. R. S. of 1840, c.
81, § 5; also c. 51, § 1. Instructions more favorable would render
the Statute provision nugatory. The word is used either in its proper
or technical sense, and either will carry with it the land necessary
to its use. Bouvier's Law Die., "House ;" R. S., c. 1, § 4; 13
Met. 109; 2 Greenleaf's Cruise 642; 27 Maine 357, 360; 3
Mason 280 and 284; 1 Sumner 500.
From the view taken by the Court of this instruction, further
reference to the other questions of law, the evidence reported, and
the arguments of counsel relating thereto, becomes unnecessary.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
CUTTING, J.-The defendants, on the trial, contended that the
premises in controversy, at the time their road was located, were
owned by one Frederick Wingate, to whom they have paid the land
damages ; that the whole width of their road was located north of
the northerly line of the plaintiff's land; consequently ihe dividing
line of the two lots became a question of fact, and much evidence,
touching that point, was submitted to the jury. The case finds
that several deeds, plans, and locations used at the trial are submitted,
but none have been furnished, and, from the view taken, they become
unnecessary.
It was claimed by the plaintiff that a portion of the road was located on his lot, and so near to his dwelling-house as seriously to
incommode him in its occupancy. Upon this point the Judge instructed the jury, "that the defendants could not take the plaintiff's
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dwelling-house, nor so locate upon his land connected theremith;
as necessarily to deprive him of the reasonable use thereof as a
dwelling-house, and, whether they had so done, was a question for
them to determine." This ruling raises a question as to the construction of R. S. of 1840, c. 81, § 5, under which the location was
made, and which provides that "no corporation shall take, as
aforesaid, any meeting-house, dwelling-house, or public or private
burying-ground, without the consent of the owners." The correctness of that part of the instruction which related to the dwellinghouse is not controverted, but only the subsequent part which refers
to the inconvenient proximity of the road to the house.
It is contended, by the plaintiff's counsel, that the word "house"
is used either in its popular or technical sense, and will carry with
it the land necessary for its use ; and, to this point, is cited Bouvier's
definition, sustained by numerous authorities, that " in a grant or
demise of a house, the curtilage and garden will pass," and hence,
it is argued, that whatever passes under the term house is not
within the defendants' control by force of their charter or any law
of the State. And, further to sustain this'view, R. S., c. 1, § 4,
is referred to, which provides that "words and phrases are to be
construed according to the common meaning of the language.
Technical words and phrases, and such as have a peculiar meaning,
are to be construed as conveying such technical or peculiar meaning."
If the word dwelling-house have a technical meaning, it has also
a common meaning,-such as, "a building inhabited by man."
Jouvier. " The house in which one lives." Webster. We think
the Legislature, in the enactment of our statutes, must have understood the term dwelling-house as having a common and not a peculiar or technical meaning; otherwise burglary may be committed
by a felonious breaking and entry in the night time into a garden
or curtilage, or a civil process may be served, by leaving a.copy in
the debtor's garden or door yard, as his last and usual place of
abode. Indeed, the plaintilf cannot contend for a technical constructio-a without impeaching the ruling which he attempts to uphold. His doctrine would prohibit the defendants from locating
upon the curtilage, the garden, and, according to Bacon's definition,
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the orchard of the plaintiff, a doctrine which might exclude any
railroad track from entering or passing through cities, villages, or
any densely populated place. Such has never been the cotemporaneous construction of, or practice under, the Act.
The right of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and
confers upon the Legislature authority to take private property for
public uses, when the public exigencies require it, subject only to
that provision in our Constitution which exacts just compensation.
By this fundamental law a dwelling-house is no more exempt than
any other species of real estate, when the Legislature shall resolve
that the public exigencies require it. Hence the statute authorizing " the pulling down or demolishing any building to prevent
the spread of fires," &c. Hence, " any railroad corporation may
take and hold so much real estate as may be necessary for the location, construction, and convenient use of said road," without the
consent of the owner, except a meeting-house, dwelling-house, or
public or private burying-ground. And, we have seen that the
term dwelling-house, as used in the statute, means only the house,
and includes no part of the garden, orchard or curtilage. But the
ruling excepted to not only excludes the house, but also so much
of the adjoining land as is necessary for its reasonable use ; whereas
the statute makes no such exemption. Our neighbor's land-marks
may be as readily removed by an erroneous construction of a statute
as by physical force, and, should the law be settled in conformity
with the instruction, every railroad corporation would be left to the
mercy of the owners of dwelling-houses situated in the vicinity of
the locations ; for, if the company have taken land without consent,
necessary for the reasonable use of the house, it has exceeded its
authority, as much so as though it had taken the house itself, and
its daily use is a daily trespass, subjecting the corporation even to
an indictment for erecting and continuing a nuisance. Every individual whose land has thus been taken might institute suits, and
raise issues of fact for the jury, as to whether too great encroachments had been made upon their dwellings. The right of eminent
domain, thus exercised, would become a farce, and a railroad, to be
permanent, should be located in a wilderness. And, hence, we per-
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ceive the wisdom of the Legislature in making no such exemp.
tions-creating no such uncertainties, and laying no such founda
tion for endless litigation ; while, on the other hand, ample provision
is made to obtain indemnity for such encroachments, and it has
been the uniform practice, if we mistake not, of the County Commissioners, having jurisdiction over the subject-matter, to assess
damages proportionate to the injury sustained. Vide Dodge vs.
County Commissioners of Essex, 3 Met. 382.
Exceptions sustained, verdict set aside, and new trial granted.
The foregoing case, which we have
received through the courtesy of Mr.
Justice CUTTING, involves a question of

some practical interest: how far such
public or private structures as meetinghouses and dwelling-houses may be said
to include adjoining lots sufficient to
make their use convenient or comfortable. In a popular sense,.these terms
may be used to designate not only the
structures, and the land upon which
they stand, but the adjoining lot and
such convenient accessory out-buildings
as were constructed exclusively for use
in connection with the principal buildings. But in a strict legal sense, we
should never haveexpected these terms
to receive so extended a construction.
The statute upon which the principal
case arose is one whichowe should not
expect many of the states would adopt.
It abridges the power of these public
works in regard to the adoption of the
most eligible route, in a manner which
has not been common in other countries.
The same result is attained in the English statute, by providing that when a
railway, or other company possessing
the power of eminent domain, desires

to take any portion of the lot or gardens
belonging to a dwelling-house or other
building, of the several classes enumerated in the stntute, they shall take the
whole of the connected premises, if the
owner shall so elect: 8 aud 9 Vict. ch.
18, J 192. The terms of the English statute are house, garden, yard, warehouse,
building, or manufactory. This was
held not to extend to a lumber yard:
Stone vs. Commercial Railway, 9 Sim.
621; s. c., 1 Railw. Cas. 375; Regina
vs. Sheriff of Middlesex, 3 Railw. Cas.
396.
By the English statute, -it has been
considered that the owner bad an option whether the company should take
the whole or a part of the connected
premises, when the whole was not required for their convenient use: Sparrow vs. Oxford W. & W. Railway Co.,
13 Eng. Law & Eq. Rep 33. But the
company, by giving notice to take part,
will not be bound to take the whole,
upon the owner so electing, provided
the company ultimately prefer waiving
their claim altogether: Queen vs. London & S. W. Railway Co., 5 Railw. Cas.
669.
1. F. R.

WHITE vs. MADISON.

In the Court of Appeals of the State of New York.
WHITE, RECEIVER, ETC., VS. MADISON.'
L Whenever a person enters into a contract as agent. for another, he warrants his
own authority, unless very special circumstances, or an express agreement, relieve
him from that responsibility.
2 Where one pretending to be an agent has contracted as such without authority
from the principal, the party contracted with, on learning the facts, has the
right to repudiate the contract and hold the assumed agent immediately responsible for damages, without waiting for the time when an action might be maintained on the contract itself.
3. The damages in such a case are measured- not by the contract, but by the
injury resulting from the agent's want of power.
4. If special damages should be incurred in consequence of the agent's failure to
bind his principal, such as the costs of an unsuccessful action against the principal to enforce the contract, they might be recovered.
5. If the act of the agent be fraudulent, an action for the deceit would lie, but it
would be a concurrent remedy with the action on the warranty.
6. It is competent to show by parol, the grounds on which a verdict or judgment
was rendered, when the grounds become material and do not appear on the
record.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court.
This action was by the Receiver of an Insurance Company, to
recover the amount due on a premium note made by the jdefendant
in the name of one Snow, and which note was signed N. D. Snow,
Sheriff of Chau. county, by A. Z. Madison, Dep. Shef. The
defendant, at the time of the execution of the note, was the deputy
of said Snow, who was then the sheriff of Chautauque county,
and as such deputy bad seized goods in transitufrom New York
to Indiana on attachment, and at the same time being agent of
said insurance company, caused said goods to be insured for one
year in said company, assuming to act throughout and executing
all the papers as deputy sheriff, signing the name and office of the
sheriff by A. Z. Madison, deputy sheriff. The company issued
the policy upon no other consideration than the said note and the
advance premium. The complaint, among other things, set forth
1 We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of Henry R. Mygatt, Esq.
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the proceedings in an unsuccessful suit against said Snow on shid
note, and demanded judgment for the costs of that suit, together
with the full amount of the note, and claimed that the assessments
for losses were equal to that amount.
The Judge at the Circuit ordered judgment for the plaintiff,
and the Supreme Court, at General Term, affirmed that judgment,
from which judgment at General Term an appeal was had to the
Court of Appeals.
Benry B. Myjgatt, for the plaintiff.
John Wait, for the defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
J.-It was proved, on the trial in this case,
that the defendant, on the trial of the former action against the
sheriff, testified that he had no authority from the sheriff to execute in his name the note mentioned in the complaint, unless that
authority was within his general powers as a deputy of the sheriff;
and the counsel on both sides have assumed that he had, as deputy,
no such authority. It seems also to have been assumed that the
sheriff had no power to insure, in his official capacity, the goods
attached, and that consequently the deputy could not insure them
in his name. The question of power on the part of the deputy
to execute the note in the name of the sheriff does not depend
upon that position. If the deputy had power to insure in the
name of the sheriff, he could not, in effecting such insurance,
subject the sheriff to the hazards of that most unsafe of partnerships, a mutual insurance company. He may have had power to
insure the sheriff's goods, without having power to make him the
insurer of other people's goods. The latter power was attempted
to be exercised when he made the note in question, and ihis was
undoubtedly beyond his general authority.
The defendant having executed the note in the name of Snow,
without authority, would be held liable, according to several decisions in this State, as the maker of the note :.Dusen uryj vs. Ellis,
HENRY R. SELDEN,
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3 Johns. Cases 70; iFeeter vs. Hfeath, 11 Wend. 478; JTfite vs.
Sinner,13 Johns. 807 ; Rossiter vs. .Rossiter, 8 Wend. 494; 1feech
vs. Smith, 7 Id. 315; Palmer vs. Stephens, 1 Denio 480; Plumb
vs. H'ilk, 19f Barb. 74. The authority of these cases has been sormewhat shaken by the remarks of the Judges who delivered opinions
in the case of Walker vs. The Bank of the State of Yew York, 5
Seld. 582; and in England, as well as in several of the United
States, the principle upon which they rest, if they are supposed
to present the only ground of liability of the agent, has been substantially repudiated: Oollen vs. Wright, 40 Eng. L. & E. 182;
Randell vs. Trimen, 3T Id. 275; Lewis vs. Nicholson, 12 Id. 430;
S ont vs. Blbery, 10 M. & W. 1; Polhill vs. Walter, a B. & Ad.
114 ; d'enkin3 vs. Hutchinson,13 Ad. & Ellis, N. S. 744; Long vs.
Colburn, 11 Mass. 96; Ballou vs. Talbot, 16. Id. 461; Jefts vs.
York, 4 Cush. 371; S. C. 10 Id. 392; Abbey vs. Chase, 6 Id. 54;
Stetson.vs. Patten, Greenl. 359; Bank vs. Flanders,4 N. H. 239;
Woodes vs. Dennett, 9 Id. 55; Johinson vs. Smith, 21 Conn. 627;
Ogden vs. -aymond, 22 Id. 379; Taylor vs. Shelton, 30 Id. 122;
~opkin.s vs. illaffy, 11 S. & R. 126; 2 Smith's Leading Oases
222; Story on Agency, § 264 a, and note 1.
If it were necessary, in disposing of the present case, to decide
the question whether, as a general principle, one entering into a
contract in the name of another without authority, is to be himself holden as a party to the contract, I should hesitate to affirm
such a principle. By that rule, Courts would often make contracts
for parties which neither intended or would have consented to
make. The contract, if binding upon one party,.must be binding
upon both, and where burdensome conditions precedeiit were to be
performed by the party contracting with the assumed agent, before
performance could be demanded of the other party, or where the
agent should undertake to sell, lease, or mortgage the property
of the assumed principal, or where credit should be given, which
the responsibility of the agent would not justify, great injustice
might result from such a rule. In those cases, and I think in al.
ca'ses where one pretending to be an agent has contracted as such
without authority from the principal, thq party contracted with, on
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learning the facts, must have the right to repudiate the contract,
and to hold the assumed agent immediately responsible for damages, without waiting for the time when an action might be maintained on the contract itself; and the damages must be measured,
not by the contract, but by the injury resulting from the agent's
want of power. Whenever a person enters into a contract as
agent for another, he warrants his own authority, unless very special circumstances, or express agreement, relieve him from that
responsibility: 8mout vs. B2bery, 10 M. & W. 9-10; Polhill vs.
Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 114; Jenkins vs. Hutclnson, 13 Ad. & Ellis,
N. S. 744; Jefts vs. York, 10 Cush. 395; 5 Seld. 585; Story on
Agency, § 264. An action upon such warranty must always be
appropriate where personal liability attaches to an agent in consequence of his contracting without authority. In such action the
plaintiff would be relieved from the necessity of showing performance of conditions precedent, and from the delay which the terms
of the contract might.require, if the remedy were limited to an
action on the contract; and if special damages should be incurred
in consequence of the agent's failure to bind his principal, such as
the costs of an unsuccessful action against the principal to enforce
the contract, they might be recovered. If the act of the agent were
fraudulent, an action for the deceit would lie, but it would be a
concurrent remedy with an action on the warranty, and so I apprehend must be the action on the contract itself, if the cases
which sustain such action are to be regarded as correctly decided.
In Dusenbryvs. Ellis, 3 Johns. Cases 70, the leading case in this
State sustaining such an action, it does not appear what time the
note executed by the assumed agent had to run at the time when
it was given. Supposing it to have been given payable a' a very
distant day, was the holder, after discovering that Dusenbury had
no authority from Sharpe (the assumed principal) to give it, bound
to wait until the note became due, and then sue Dusenbury'on the
note as his contract; or could he repudiate the contract, and immediately sue Dusenbury on the warranty of authority; implied,
or rather as I think expressed, in the execution of the note ? There
can be but one answer to this question, and that is in favor of the
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right to repudiate the principal contract, and to prosecute on the
subordinate contract of warranty, whether the right between that
course and an action on the principal contract existed or not.
Whether Ellis, as endorsee of the note, could have maintained an
action on the warranty, which was made originally to Fish, the
payee, might be doubtful, unless it appeared that the agent knew
he was acting without authority, in which case, according to English decisions, he would be liable on the warranty to- any one receiving the paper, the representation of his authority being in
effect made to all to whom it might be offered in the course of circulation: Polhill vs. Walter, 3 B. & Ad. 114.
If the party receiving the note in the present case must be
charged, as claimed by the defendant's counsel, with knowledge
of the -extent of the defendant's ordinary powers as a deputy of
the sheriff (which is very questionable), the want of special authority for this particular act was not communicated, and could not
be known. The defendant, therefore, is not within the cases in
which agents have been held excused from liability for acts beyond their authority, when they have acted in good faith, and the
facts affecting their authority were equally well known to both
parties: Srmout vs. Ilbery, 10 i. & W. 11; Story on Agency,
§§ 265, 265 a.
The recovery seems to have proceeded in the Court'below upon
the ground that this was an action upon the note. It is rather, I
think, to be regarded as an action on the warranty. The complaint states all the facts in respect to the making of the note by
the defendant in the name of Snow, that he exequted it without
authority, and that the company issued the policy upon no other
consideration than the note and the advance premium, relying on
the authority of the defendant to execute the note. It also sets
forth the proceedings in an unsuccessful suit against Snow on the
note, and demands judgment for the costs of that suit, together
with the full amount of the note, the assessments for losses being
equal to that amount. On the facts stated, the law implies a warranty of authority by the defendant to execute the note for Snow,
md it was unnecessary, under our present system of pleading, to
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allege that legal inference: -Enovs. Woodward, 4 Comst. 249, 253.
In an action on the note as the contract of the defendant, a claim
for the costs of a suit to enforce the note against Snow, would be
absurd. The amount of the note, less the assessment paid, was
made the measure of damages, as if the action had been upon the
note ; but the allegations and proof showed that the share of
the losses of the company chargeable upon the note during the
time covered by the policy prior to its surrender, were equal to
the amount of the note. That possibly might be regarded as a
proper measure of damages upon the breach of warranty, but
whether that be so or not, no question having been made before
the jury as to the amount of the recovery, if the defendant was
liable at all, none can be made now.
I think the sheriff had an insurable interest in the goods, and
that the policy was valid. The sheriff, by the seizure on the
attachment, acquired a special property in the goods, which would
have enabled him to. maintain an action, and to recover their full
value, against any one who should take them out of his custody:
2 Saund. 47, note 1 ; Story on Bailm. §. 125; 2 Mass. 514; 3
Hill 215. Such special property gave him an insurable interest.
It was his duty to keep the property safely until sold or released,
and he was chargeable for its destruction by any cause against
which he could protect it by ordinary care, if he was not subject
to a more stringent rule of respons ibility: 5 Hill 588; 21 N. Y.
103. Although he was under no obligation to insure, he could, if
he chose, protect himself against this risk by insurance. "A
bailee or depositary being liable by law or by contract for certain
risks, whereby the subjects bailed or deposited may be damaged
or lost, has an insurable interest in it in respect to such risks:" 1
Phil. on Ins., 4th e.d. 121, § 191. "A man is interested in a
thing to whom advantage may arise, or prejudice happen from the
circumstances that may attend it,'* * and whom it importeth that
its condition as to safety or. other quality should continue :" 2 iNew
Rep. 302 : 1 Hall 84, 102-3.
The puocy having been obtained in the name of the sheriff, he
had a right to ratify it at any time during the term of insurance:
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2 TA. & S. 485; Story on Agency, § 248; although doubtless by
doing so he would have ratified the giving of the note by the
defendant, and made himself liable upon it. The section of Story
on Agency, above referred to, shows that the underwriters bear
the risk in such cases until there is a disavowal by the principal.
This risk formed a consideration for the undertaking of the
defendant, sufficient to sustain the recovery either upon the note
or the warranty, and to the extent of that recovery, neither party
having asked the Court to submit the question of damages to the
jury.
The position of the defendant's counsel is doubtless correct,
that if the sheriff was authorized to insure the goods, the deputy
who seized them might insure them in his name, but this power,
for the reasons given above, did not authorize .the deputy to give
the note in question.
It is unnecessary to determine whether the expenses of insurance would constitute a claim in favor of the sheriff against the
parties or either of them, or against the property. If the attachment was issued under the provisions of chap. 5 of the Second
Part of the Revised Statutes, 2 R. S. p. 3, it would doubtless be
competent for the officer by whom the attachment was issued to
allow such claim: Laws of 1830, p. 411, § 56; 8 R. S. 3d ed. p.
925-6; but without some special provision *of statute on the subject, it is presumed that the claim of the sheriff for seizing and
holding goods by virtue of attachments or executions must be
limited to the specific fees provided for the service of such process,
without reference to the expenses to which he might be subjected
in removing them to. a place of reasonable security if their position were hazardous, or in such care of them as the law required
from him, 21 N. Y. 103, whether he should choose to remove them,
or to bestow such care, or to protect himself against the possible
consequences of neglect by insurance: 15 Wend. 44; 2 T. R.
148, 158; 7 M. & W. 413; 11 Id. 620; 12 Id. 31; 14 Id. 802;
Crocker on Sheriffs, §§ 1096-7, 1110-11; Sewell on Sheriffs 252,
480, 481.
It was within the powers of the company to issue the policy to
Snow, and to take security, or receive the premium from the
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defendant, and to prosecute the defendant for any default in performing his engagements. The provision in the statute authorizing
the corporation to maintain suits against members or stockholders
(Laws of 1849, p. 448, § 16), which is supposed by the defendant's
counsel to limit the right of action of such corporation to suits
against members or stockholders, was not designed to restrict its
power to maintain suits, but to remove a.'possible doubt as to its
right to maintain suits at law against members and stockholders,
arising from the quasi partnership character of such companies.
By § 17 these corporations are clothed with all the powers of any
corporations to maintain suits.
If the action were to be regarded as brought, and the recovery
bad upon the note, it might be doubtful whether the judgment
could be sustained, because the plaintiff has neither alleged nor
proved enough to show to the Court that the defendant was in
default in paying the note, regarding it as his personal obligation.
By the terms of the npte it was payable ,at such time or times
as the directors of said company may agreeably to their act of
incorporation require." The act of incorporation here referred
to is the charter of the company, which the statute requires the
original corporation to make and file in the office of the Secretary
of State: Laws of 1849, ch. 308, §§ 8, 10, 12, 16. There does
not seem to be anything in the statute under which the company
was organized to which the reference could be held applicable.
Neither the pleadings nor the proofs show what the provisions of
the charter of the Union Insurance Company were, and consequently it does not appear whether the maker of the note was in
default or not. The allegations in the complaint of notice of the
assessment by publication and by mail are put in issue by the
answer, and if we could assume that those allegations indicated
correctly what was required by the charter to charge the parties
assessed, there is an entire want of proof on the subject./ This
objection is distinctly presented by the third ground of the defendant's motion for a nonsuit, and if the plaintiff was confined
to a recovery on the note, I think this objection would be fatal to
his action; but regarding the liability as depending on the warranty, no assessment or notice was necessary.
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Several objections were taken by the defendant to the introduction of testimony, but with the exception of those relating to the
action against Snow, they are so clearly untenable as not to
require notice. If this action was to be regarded as an action
simply to charge the defendant as the maker of the note, the
record in the case of Snow would not have been admissible against
the defendant. Assuming that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to show that the defendant was not authorized to make the
note for Snow, 19 Barb. 74, this record, to which the defendant
was a stranger, was not admissible to prove that fact, or as having
any tendency to prove it, though it might have been otherwise if
seasonable notice had been given to the defendant, that his authority to make the note for Snow was denied in that suit, and
requiring him to maintain his authority on the trial: 2 Cow. &
Hill's Notes 817. If the record was inadmissible, the parol evi.dence of the grounds on which the decision proceeded was equally
so. Nor was the record necessary to authorize the introduction
of proof of what the defendant testified to on that trial, showing
his want of authority. What he said in the witness-box was admissible against him, as declarations made at any other time would
be, without reference to his oath, or to the issues in the record.
But resting the plaintiff's right of recovery, as I do, upon the
warranty, the record was admissible to show that the plaintiff had
been subjected to the expenses of an action in attempting to
enforce the contract against the principal whom the defendant
undertook to bind. These expenses, the action being brought in
good faith, were a legitimate item of damages in the present action:
.Randell vs. Trimen, 87 L. & E. 275; s. c. 86 Eng. O. L. R. 786;
Oollen vs. Wright, 40 Eng. L. & B. 182; and the parol evidence
was admissible to rebut a possible inference that the nonsuit was
granted on account of some formal defect in the prosecution of the
action. It is always competent to show by parol the grounds on
which a verdict or judgment was rendered, when the grounds become material and do not appear in the record: Wood vs. Jackson,
8 Wend. 10, 45; Dot, vs. Brown, 4 Comst. 71, 75.
The judgment should be affirmed.

MORTON vs. THE N. Y. EYE INFIRMARY.

United States Circuit Court.-Southern Districtof New York.
WILLIAM T. G. MORTON VS. THE NEW YORK EYE INFIRMARY.
At commo)n law an inventor has no exclusive right to his invention.

Sach right

is the creature of the statute by which alone the right claimed in any given case
must be determined.
In its strict sense a discovery is not patentable.
The discovery of the use of ether in surgical operations, though of inestimable
benefit to the human race, was merely the discovery of a more perfect effect of
the action of well-known agents, operating by well-known means upon wellknown subjects, and as such was not legally entitled to be patented.

Motion for a new trial.
Mr. Cozzens and Mr. KYeller, for the motion.
Mr. Owen and Mr. B. D. Sillinan, contra.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
SHIPMAN, J.-This is an action at law brought to recover
damages for the infringement of a well-known patent. The case
came on to be heard at a prior term of this Court before a jury,
and after some testimony had been taken tending to show an infringement by the defendants, the Court, having doubts as to the
validity of the patent, arrested the hearing of the evidence, and
directed the counsel to argue the question of law arising on the
face of the specification. This question is-as will be at once
obvious to any one familiar with the law of patents who reads the
specification-is the subject-matter of the alleged invention patentable? The question, after argument, was decided in the negative,
and the patent declared void. The same question is now again
presented, on a motion for a new trial, before a full Court. The
point is one of substance and not of form. It was discussed as
such, and will be so decided. Any criticisms which we may make
on the language of the specification will be made only for the purpose of dealing with the subject which that language envelops;
and if at any time we appear to discard the phraseology of the
instrument, it will not be because we complain of its terms, but only
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for the reason that we desire to strip the alleged invention and
present it naked for consideration. As various parts of the specification were referred to on the argument as having a bearing on the
single point raised, it is proper to give the whole instrument, which
is in the following words:The Schedule referred to in these Letters -Patent,and naking part
of the same.
"To all persons to whom these presents shall come:
"Be it known that we, Charles T. Jackson and William T. G.
Morton, of Boston, in the county of Suffolk, and State of Massachusetts, have invented or discovered a new and useful improvement
in surgical operations on animals, whereby we are enabled to
accomplish many, if not all, operations such as are usually attended
with more or less pain and suffering, without any, or with very little,
pain to, or muscular action of, persons who undergo the same; and
we do hereby declare that the following is a full and exact description of our said invention or discovery.
"It is well known to chemists that when alcohol is submitted to
distillation with certain acids, peculiar compounds, termed ethers,
are formed, each of which is usually distinguished by the name of
the acid employed in its preparation. It has also been known that
the vapors of some, if not all, of these chemical distillations, particularly those of sulphuric ether, Nhen breathed or introduced into
the lungs of an animal, have produced a peculiar effect on its
nervous system; one which has been supposed to be analogous to
what is usually termed intoxication.
"It has never (to our knowledge) been known, until our discovery,
that the inhalation of such vapors (particularly those of sulphuric
ether) would produce insensibility to pain, or such a state of quiet
of nervous action as to render a person or animal incapable, to a
great extent, if not entirely, of experiencing pain while under the
action of the knife, or other instrument of operation of a surgeon
calculated to produce pain. This is our discovery; and the combining it with, or applying it to, any operation of surgery, for the
purpose of alleviating animal suffering, as well as of enabling a
VOL. XI.-43
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surgeon to conduct his operation with little or no struggling ox
muscular action of the patient, and with more certainty of success,
constitutes our invention. The nervous quiet and insensibility to
pain produced on a person is generally of short duration; the degree
or extent of it, or, time which it lasts, depends on the amount of
ethereal vapor received into the system, and the constitutional
character of the person to whom it is administered. Practice will
soon acquaint an experienced surgeon with the amount of etheric
vapor to be administered to persons for the accomplishment of the
surgical operation or operations required in their respective cases.
For the extraction of a tooth, the individual may be thrown into
the insensible state, generally speaking, only a few minutes. For
the removal of a tumor, or the performance of the amputation of a
limb, it is necessary to regulate the amount of vapor inhaled to the
time required to complete the operation. Various modes m ay be
adopted for conveying the etheric vapor into the lungs. A very
simple one is to saturate a piece of cloth or sponge with sulphuric
ether and place it to the nostrils or mouth, so that the person may
inhale the vapors. A more effective one is to take a glass, or other
proper vessel, like a common bottle or flask. Place in it a sponge
saturated with sulphuric ether. Let there be a hole made through
the side of the vessel for the admission of atmospheric air (which
hole may or may not be provided with a valve opening downwards, or so as to allow air to pass into the vessel), a valve on the
outside of the neck opening upwards, and another valve in the
neck and between that last mentioned and the body of the vessel
or flask, which latter valve in the neck should open towards the
mouth of the neck or bottle. The extremity of the neck-is to be
placed in the mouth of the patient, and his nostrils stopped or
closed in such manner as to cause him to inhale air through the
bottle, and to exhale it through the neck and out of the valve on
the ouside of the neck. The air thus breathed, by passing in contact with the sponge, will be charged with the etheric vapors, which
will be conveyed by it into the lungs of the patient. This will soon
produce the state of insensibility or nervous quiet required.
"In order to render the ether agreeable to various persons, we
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often combine it with one or more essential oils having pleasant
perf mes. This may be effeeted by mixing the ether and essential
oil, and washing the mixture in water. The impurities will subside, and the ether, impregnated with the perfume, will rise to the
top of the water. We sometimes combine a narcotic preparation,
such as opium or morphine, with the ether. This may be done by
any ways known to chemists by which a combination of etheric and
narcotic vapors may be produced. After a person has been put
into the state of insensibility as above described, a surgical operation may be performed upon him without, so far as repeated experiments have proved, giving to him any apparent or real pain,
or so little in comparison to that produced by the usual process of
conducting surgical operations as to be scarcely noticeable. There
is very nearly, if not entire, absence of all pain. Immediately, or
soon after the operation is completed, a restoration of the patient
to his usual feelings takes place, without, generally speaking, his
having been sensible of the performance of the operation.
"From the experiments we have made, we are led to prefer the
vapors of sulphuric ether to those of muriatic or other kind of
ether, but any such may be employed which will properly produce
the state -of insensibility without any injurious consequences to the
patient.
"We are fully aware that narcotics have been administered to
patients undergoing surgical operations, as we believe always by
introducing them into the stomach. This we consider in no respect
to embody our invention, as we operate througl" the lungs and airpassages, and the effects produced upon the patient are'entirely or
so far different as to render the one of very little, while the other
is of immense, utility. The consequences of the change are very
considerable, as an immense amount of human or animal suffering
can be prevented by the application of our discovery.
"What we claim as our invention is the hereinbefore-described
means by which we are enabled to effect the above highly important
improvement in surgical operations, viz., by combining therewith
the application of ether or the vapor thereof substantially as above
specified.
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"In testimony whereof we have hereto set our signatures, this
27th day of October, A. D. 1846.

(Signed)

-.

"Witnesses :WM.
"R. H. EDDY.
" W. H. LEIGHTON."

"CHARLES

T.

JACKSON.

T. G. MORTON.

At common law an inventor has no exclusive right to his invention or discovery. That exclusive right is the creature of the
statute, and to that we must look to see if the right claimed in a
given case is within its terms. The Act of Congress provides,
"That any person or persons having discovered or invented any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, not known or used by others
before his or their discovery or invention thereof, and not 'at the
time of his application for a patent in public use or on sale with his
consent or allowance as the inventor or discoverer," shall be entitled
to receive a patent therefor. The true field of inquiry in the
present case is to ascertain whether or not the alleged invention set
forth in this specification is embraced within the scope of the Act.
Very little light can be shed on our path by attempting to draw a
practical distinction between the legal purport of the words "discovery" and "1invention." In its naked, ordinary sense, a discovery is not patentable. A discovery of a new principle, force,
or law,. operating, or which can be made to operate, on matter, will
not entitle the discoverer to a patent. It is only where the explorer
has gone beyond the mere domain of discovery and has .laid hold
of the new principle, force, or law, and connected it with some particular medium or mechanical contrivance by which, or through
which, it acts on the material world, that he can secure the exclusive control of it under the Patent Act. He then controls his discovery through the means by which he has brought it into practical
action, or their equivalent, and only through them. It is then an
invention, although it embraces a discovery. Sever the force or
principle discovered from the means or mechanism through which
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he has brought it into the domain of invention, and it immediately
falls out of that domain and eludes his grasp. It is then a naked
discovery, and not an invention.
These remarks are not made for the purpose of laying down
sweeping general propositions. We are too well aware of the
futility, or we might say mischief, of that practice of expounding
the law of patents to embark in it. But these suggestions are submitted for the purpose of showing the relation of the terms "discovery" and "invention," and especially the dependence of the
former upon the latter, as used in the statute. Every invention
may, in a certain sense, embrace more or less of discovery, for it
must always include something that is new; but it by no means
follows that every discovery is an invention. It may be the soul
of an invention, but it cannot be the subject of the exclusive control
of the patentee, or the patent law, until it inhabits a body, no more
than can a disembodied spirit be subjected to the control of human
laws.
Now, that this patent contains the record of a discovery there can
be no doubt. And it is equally clear that, in a certain sense, it
was new at about the date of the patent. It is important here to
ascertain precisely what that discovery was. It is described in
general terms, in the first paragraph of the specification, to be "a
new and useful improvement in surgical operations di animals."
This is at best vague-not from any fault of the person who drafted
the schedule, but from the inherent difficulties of his task, and the
imperfect nature of human language as an instrument of thought.
But we can clearly gather from the paper itself what tbe discovery
was; and we are aided in this by those parts of the specification
which state what was old and well known. The second paragraph
recites: "It is well known to chemists that where alcohol is submitted to distillation with certain acids, peculiar compounds, termed
ethers, are formed, each of which is usually distinguished by the
name of the acid employed in its preparation." The origin and
existence of ethers, those wonderful agents that produce a harmless
insensibility to pain, formed no part of the discovery. No one of
them was brought to light by these patentees, for they were all
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well known before. The same paragraph further sets forth that
"It has also been known that the vapors of some, if not all, of
these chemical distillations, particularly those of sulphuric ether,
when breathed or introduced into the lungs of an animal, have produced a peculiar effect on the nervous system, one which has been
supposed to be analogous to what is usually termed intoxication."
It was not, then, the fact that these vapors could be introduced into
the air-passages and lungs that was discovered. This was as old
as respiration, or at least as old as the existence of the vapors.
Neither was it discovered that when inhaled these vapors produced
an effect like that of intoxication, exhilaration, and more or less
stupefaction. This too had long been well known.
The next paragraph distinctly sets forth the real discovery that
was made, viz., that this well-kn6wn inhalation of well-known
agents (in increased quantities) would produce a state of the animal
analogous to complete intoxication, accompanied with total insensibility to pain. Itappropriately adds: "This is our discovery."
It is not important to inquire here whether this was the discovery
of an increased and more perfect effect, the-same in kind with that
already well known, or whether it was the discovery of an entirely
new effect. The effect discovered was produced by old agents,
operating by old means upon old subjects. The effect alone was
new, and to that only can the term "discovery" apply. That this
mere discovery, however novel and important, is not patentable,
needs neither argument nor authority to prove. This the specification impliedly concedes, for after thus clearly setting forth the discovery, a struggle is made to grapple it to something in active
existence, and thus make the two in this new special relation a
patentable invention. This is done by "combining it with or
applying it to any surgical operation." "This is our invention."
The beneficial effects described as resulting from the application,
refer merely to the utility of the alleged invention, which is not in
question, and may therefore be laid out of the case. The object
of this combining the discovery with, or applying it to, surgical
operations, is apparent. It was to shelter the discovery under
those terms of the Patent Act which protect "any new and useful
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improvement on any art." It was clearly not the discovery or invention of an " art," or " machine," or " manufacture," or "1composition of matter." Nor was it an "improvement" on any one of
the last three. It was therefore called, in substance, an improvement in the art of surgery. But we cannot change a thing by a
name. In a certain general sense it is an improvement in the art
of surgery. So would the invention of a new and useful lancet,
saw, forceps, or bandage, be an improvement on the same art. But
the patent securing the exclusive use or sale of such an instrument
must rest exclusively upon the novelty of its construction. It could
borrow no element of patentability from the art in which it was
designed to be used, except merely the element of utility. Of this
latter the art would furnish the test. Now this discovery of the
effect of ether on the patient in holding him -motionless and insensible during the operation, has the same legal relation to the
art of surgery that a machine or other mechanical contrivance for
holding him would have. It holds him better, stiller, and with less
discomfort and danger to himself than any mechanism could; but
its office is to hold and protect the patient. It has no other relation to, or connection with, the art of the surgeon. We use the
word "protect" as applied to the patient in the largest sense, and
as including not only exemption from pain during the operation,
but also from the shock which such operations often give the
system. The only legal quality or aid, then, which this alleged
invention can draw from the art with which it is connected in the
specification, is that which relates to its utility. Of this it supplies
undoubted evidence. The eminent surgeons who. testified on the
trial concurred in stating that its usefulness could not be overrated.
We must, then, leaving the art of surgery to supply the evidence
of its utility, contemplate the discovery as separated from the use
to which it is applied. At this point the patent breaks down; for
the specification presents nothing new except the effect produced
by well-known agents, administered in well-known ways on wellknown subjects. This new or additional effect is not produced by
any new instrument by which the agent is administered, nor by
any different application of it to the body of the patient. It is
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simply produced by increasing the quantity of the vapor inhaled.
And even this quantity is to be regulated by the discretion of the
.operator, and may vary with the susceptibilities of the patient to
its influence. It is nothing more, in the eye of the law, than the
application of a well-known agent, by well-known means, to a new
or more perfect use, which is not sufficient to support a patent.
But it was insisted on the argument thai the claim, at the close
of the specification, when properly understood, disclosed the true
character of the invention, and furnished ground upon which the
patent can stand. This clause declares, that "what we claim as
our invention is the hereinbefore-described means by which we are
enabled to effect the above highly important improvement in surgical operations, viz., by combining therewith the application of
ether, or the vapor thereof, substantially as above described."
The plaintiff's counsel insists that the true reading of the claim, in
the light of the preceding part of the specification, is not that
which asserts a combination of the discovery with surgicaloperations,.but rather an application of the discovery to surgical operations by the means described; "and that the means described, and
the only means described, are the process of rendering the system
insensible to pain by the inhalation of ether." But we do not discover that this exposition of the claim relieves the difficulty. What
is the process which is here set forth ? The process of inhalation
of the vapor, and nothing else. To couple with it the effect produced by calling it a process of rendering the system insensible to
pain, is merely to connect the result with the means. The means,
that is the process of inhalation of vapors, existed among the
animals of the geologic ages preceding the creation of our race.
That process, in connection with these vapors, is as old as the vapors
themselves. We come, therefore, to the same point, only by a
different road. We have, after all, only a new or more perfect
effect of a well-known chemical agent, operating through one of
the ordinary functions of animal life.
It is curious and instructive to observe the perpetual struggle in
the specification to draw from the surgical operation some support
to the patent beyond that of its utility. "We are fully aware,"
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says the paragraph immediately preceding the claim, "that narcotics have been administered to patients undergoing surgical
operations, and, as we believe, always by introducing them into the
stomach. This we consider in no respect to embody our invention,
as we operate through the lungs and air-passages." An examination of this single passage in the specification will demonstrate the
impossibility of sustaining this patent on any grounds known to the
law. Now suppose these agents had been fluids instead of elastic
vapors, and their effect had been known, when taken into the
stomach, to be the same as that now long known to have resulted
from their inhalation, viz., a state of partial intoxication. Would
the discovery that an increased quantity of the fluid produced a
more perfect effect, by rendering intoxication complete, accompanied
with total insensibility to pain, have rendered the discovery patentable ? We think clearly not. In this view of the subject, we here
lay out of the case the application of the new effect to surgical
operations. We will allude to that again in a moment. Now, A
precisely parallel case is presented, by the actual facts before us, to
the one just supposed. The inhalation of the ethers had long been
known. By increasing their quantity, it was discovered that a new
or more complete effect was produced, by which the subject was
rendered wholly insensible. This can be no more patentable than
the discovery that the increased quantity of liquors, taken into the
stomach, would produce a like result. In both cases, there is only
a naked discovery of a new effect, resulting from a well-known
agent, working by a well-known process. This effect is a temporary suspension of sensibility and motion in the animal body.
Here, what is new in the alleged invention begins and ends. The
fact that the surgeon can operate upon the body in the condition
to which it is thus reduced, forms no part of the invention or discovery. It simply furnishes evidence that it can be applied to at
least one useful purpose; a fact quite independent of the other
elements necessary to make a discovery patentable.
Before dismissing this case it may not be amiss to speak of the
character of the discovery upon which the patent is founded. Its
value in securing insensibility during the surgical operation, and
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thus saving the patient from sharp anguish while it is proceeding, and
mitigating the shock to his system, which would otherwise be much
greater, was proved on the trial by distinguished surgeons of the
city of New York. They agreed in ranking it among the great
discoveries of modern times; .and one of them remarked that its
value was too great to be estimated in dollars and cents. Its
universal use, too, concurs to the same point. Its discoverer is
entitled to be classed among the greatest benefactors of mankind.
But the beneficent and imposing character of the discovery cannot
change the legal principles upon which the law of patents is founded,
nor abrogate the rules by which judicial construction must be governed. These principles and rules are fixed, and uninfluenced by
shades and degrees of comparative merit. They secure to the
inventor a monopoly in the manufacture, use, and sale of very
humble contrivances, of limited usefulness, the fruits of indifferent
skill and trifling ingenuity, as well as those grander products of his
genius which confer renown on himself and extensive and lasting
benefits on society. But they are inadequate to the protection of
every discovery, by securing its exclusive control to the explorer
to whose eye it may be first disclosed. A discovery may be brilliant and useful, and not patentable. No matter through what
long, solitary vigils, or by what importunate efforts, the secret may
have been wrung from the bosom of nature, or to what useful purposes it may be applied. Something more is necessary. The new
force or principle brought to light must be embodied and set to
work, and can be patented only in connection or combination with
the means by which, or the medium through which, it operates.
Neither the natural functions of an animal upon which or through
which it may be designed to operate, nor any of the useful purposes to which it may be applied, can form any essential parts of
the combination, however they may illustrate and establish its usefulness.
Motion for~new trial denied.
NELSON, J.,

concurred.

MOORE vs. WESTERVELT.

Court of Apveals of _New York.
JAMES MOORE VS. JOHN J. V. WESTERVELT, SHERIFF OF THE CITY
AND COUNTY OF NEW YORK.
When a sheriff takes goods in execution or by attachment, or in an action where
the plaintiff seeks to recover possession of them, he becomes a bailee for the
benefit of all parties interested.
In such case his duties are analogous to those of a bailee where the bailment is
beneficial to both parties, as in case of hiring, and he is therefore responsible
only for such loss or damage to the goods as results from his want of ordinary
care, which is such care as a man of common prudence takes of his own affairs.

This action was brought in the Superior Court of New York
City, to recover damages for the alleged neglect of the defendant,
as sheriff of that city, to keep in a secure place and deliver to the
plaintiff, a cargo of anthracite coal, which was taken possession
of on board the schooner Calcutta at a wharf on East river in said
city, by the defendant as such sheriff, by virtue of papers delivered
to him in an action brought to recover the possession of such coal
by the plaintiff in this action against one Lewis Hoffman, who was
the master of the said schooner. The schooner was fastened to
the wharf. The sheriff did not remove the coal from the schooner,
.but left a person on board in charge of the coal with the assent of
the master. Within three days after the sheriff thus took posses:sion of the coal the schooner and coal were sunk in East river
during a gale of wind; which sinking damaged the coal that was
not lost, and the plaintiff was put to considerable expefise in raising
that portion of the coal not lost.
Hoffman did not take any steps to have the coal re-delivered to
him, and the plaintiff became entitled to the same at the expiration
of three days from the time it was seized by the sheriff, accoring
to sections 209, &c. of the Code. The plaintiff recovered a judgment in his action against Hoffman entitling him to the possession
of the coal ; and he subsequently brought this action against the
defendant as sheriff, &c. Evidence was given by both parties as
to whether the schooner was properly fastened or duly taken care
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of, and as to whether the schooner or coal was sunk by reason of
any negligence on the part of the defendant or the persons having
charge of the same after the defendant seized the coal and claimed
to have possession of it.
The action has been tried several times (see decisions in the
same, 1 Bosworth 357, 2 Duer 59). On the last trial Charles H.
Hallenback, a witness for the defendant, testified that he had been
in freighting establishments seven years where they had vessels
running from Hudson to New York; that he had. been a clerk on
board of a steamboat some three years that he had charge of
mooring the vessel when the captain was off, though he did not
leave that altogether to his charge, but to his and the pilots; and
that he thought he (the witness) understood it. lie described the
situation of the schooner, and testified that it was fastened at the
bow and stern with hawsers, and that he had charge of the coal by
direction of the defendant. He also stated the hawsers were a
large rope and the kind usually used for fastening vessels. The
defendant's counsel put this question to this witness: - Please state
what was the condition of the fastenings of this vessel as to safety ?"
It was objected to on the ground that it was not a question of
science, and that the jury were just as competent to judge of it as
the witness. The objection was overruled, and the plaintiff's counsel
excepted. The witness answered, "I should judge that she was
safely moored." By the Court: "You mean to say that the
fastenings were proper fastenings for a vessel in that condition."
Answer: - Yes, sir; I have seen vessels time and time moored in
the same way." By the Court: -In ordinary times?" Answer:
CcYes, sir." Question: With reference to a storm, how was it ?"
Answer: - I could not say; it would depend upon how severe the
storm would be ; sometimes our ships have broken them, and at
other times with a storm not quite so heavy they would not part
them."
Evidence was given that.the schooner was leaky; as to the
severity of the gale; and as to the manner the schooner was taken
care of; and as to the circumstances under which she was sunk.
The Judge charged the jury that the greatquestion in the case
.
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was whether the sheriff, after having taken the coal into his possession, was guilty of such negligence in regard to its care and preservation, as occasioned its injury and consequent loss to the
plaintiff. That it was the duty of the sheriff to take such steps to
insure the safety of the coal, as a careful, prudent man of good
sense and judgment, well acquainted with the condition of the vessel
and her location with regard to exposure to storms, and having all
thepower of the sheriff in the matter, might reasonably have been
expected to take, had the coal belonged to himself.
That if the jury came to the conclusion the sheriff did not take
that degree of care for the preservation of the coal he had thus
indicated, and that the injury was occasioned by the negligence of
the defendant or his officers, the plaintiff would be entitled to a
verdict. The plaintiff's counsel interposed: ic I ask the Court to
charge that the sheriff is responsible for the negligence of the
master and crew after he took possession." The Judge then said,
" The sheriff was bound to do this. If such an owner as I have
indicated would have taken the coal from the vessel as it lay at the
wharf in the first instance, the sheriff was bound to do it. He was
bound to know the condition of the vessel, whether it leaked,
whether it was seaworthy for the place in which it lay, how deeply
laden, everything in regard to it, and he was bound to put on board
the vessel if necessary, such men as would pump her out, and keep
her in a condition to insure the safety of the coal." The defendant's counsel interposed: -I ask the Court to charge the jury,
that if a prudent man in a case of his own vessel, would not have
removed her in the storm, the sheriff would not be bound to." By
the Court: " Certainly he would not." To which the counsel for
the plaintiff excepted. The following requests of the plaintiff's
counsel to charge the jury were presented to the Court before the
charge was made, viz: "1st. That the sheriff was bound to take
more than ordinary care of this property, and if for the want of
more than ordinary care the property was lost, he is responsible.
2d. That if the sinking happened from the want of due caution
either by the sheriff, deputy sheriff, captain, master, or hands of
the vessel, then the sheriff is responsible." The plaintiff's counsel
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separately excepted to the refusal of the Court to charge the jury
as firstly, secondly, and lastly requested to charge. The jury
rendered a verdict in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff's counsel
made a motion for a new trial on the minutes of the Court, which
was denied, and judgment was entered on the -verdict in favor of
the defendant for costs. The general term of the Superior Court
affirmed the judgment, and the plaintiff appealed to this Court.
The decision of this Court when the cause was here the first
time, is reported in 21 N. Y. Reports, page 103.
KI. H. Burlock, for plaintiff.
A. J. Vanderpoel, for defendant.
June 1863. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
BALCOM, J.-The witness, Hallenbeck, had had some experience
in mooring vessels, and said he thought he understood it; he stated
how the schooner, having the coal in question on board, was
moored; and I am of the opinion he was competent to answer the
question, "What was the condition of the fastenings of this
schooner as to safety ?" The business of mooring vessels requires
skill to do it properly; bu Hallenbeck possessed enough to render
his opinion, as to whether the schooner was safely moored, competent evidence, though it certainly was not entitled to much
weight, and probably did not have much influence with the jury.
When the cause was in this Court the first time, Judge SELDEN
intimated an opinion that the sheriff was responsible for more than
ordinary diligence in taking care of the coal; but the Court did
not so decide.
According to section 209 of the Code, it was the duty of the
sheriff to take the coal, and retain it in his custody; and section
215 required him to keep it in a secure place, and deliver it to
the party entitled thereto, who was the plaintiff, after the expiration
of three days, as Hoffman did not take any steps for its re-delivery
to him pursuant to section 211. But the defendant, as sheriff, did
not, under the circumstances, become an insurer of the coal: 21
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N. Y. Reports 103. In Jenner vs. Joliffe, 6 Johns. 9, THOmPSOn,
J., in delivering the opinion of the Court, said: -If the loss of
the timber happened while it was held under the attachment, and
without the negligence of the officer, the defendant ought not to
be responsible for it." In Browning vs. fTanford, 5 Hill 588,
COWENW, J., was of the opinion Justice STORY was right in putting
the general liability of officers having the charge of property on
the same footing as that of bailees for hire. See Story on Bailments § 130, 3d ed. Edwards says: "A sheriff levying upon
goods, must use due diligence to keep them safely to satisfy the
execution. But he is not an insurer, and is not, like a common
carrier, answerable for a loss of the goods by fire. His capacity
as an officer, is not considered as fixing a more rigorous measure
of liability upon him than if he were a private'person." It seems
that the views of this learned author, in regard to the liability of
sheriffs having the charge of property, coincide with those of
Justice STORY. See Edwards on Bailments 59.
When a sheriff takes goods in execution, or by attachment, or
in an action *here the plaintiff seeks to recover possession of them,
he becomes a bailee for the benefit of all parties interested-certainly for the behefit of the party who sets him in motion; and
"where the bailment is beneficial to both parties, as in case of
pledging or letting to hire, the bailee must answer for ordinary
neglect :" 1 Cowen Tr., 2d ed., 56. A bailee for hire, or where
the bailment is beneficial to both parties, must exercise ordinary
diligence in taking care of the property he has in trust; which is
the care that every person of common prudence; and capable of
governing a family, takes of his own concerns. The converse of
this is the omission of that care which such a person takes of his
own concerns, and is termed ordinary neglect. Edwards on Bailments 44.
I am unable to see why a sheriff should be required to exercise
any greater diligence in taking care of property in his custody,
than a bailee for hire: and I am of the opinion the degree of dili.
gence each. is bound to exercise is the same.
If I am right in this conclusion, the charge was as favorable to
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the plaintiff as it should have been. The chai ge was, that it 'was
the duty of the sheriff to take such steps to insure the safety of
the coal, as a careful, prudent man of good sense and judgment,
well acquainted with the condition of the schooner, and her location
with regard to exposure to storms, and having the power of the
sheriff in the matter, might reasonably havQ been expected to take,
had the coal belonged to himself.
The subsequent remarks of the Judge, that if a prudent man in
a case of his own vessel, would not have removed her in the storm,
the sheriff was not bound to, did not make the charge exceptionable. If the sheriff did as the Judge charged it was his duty to
do, he certainly exercised ordinary care in taking care of the coal:
and his omission to remove the schooner, if a prudent man would
not have done so in the storm, provided she had been his own, was
not ordinary neglect. The jury had previously been instructed
that the sheriff was bound to know the condition of the schooner,
whether it leaked, whether it was seaworthy for the place in which
it lay, how deeply laden, everything in regard to it; and that he
was bound to put on board of the schooner, if necessary, such men
as would pump her out, and keep her in a condition to insure the
safety of the coal. This is all a careful, prudent man could havc
known, or would have done, if he had owned the schooner. And
as I understand the charge, it made the sheriff responsible for the
alleged negligence of the master and crew of the schooner after

he took possession, so far at least as they had anything to do with
the schooner or coal; and in this view of the charge, the refusal
of the Judge to repeat or state to the .jury the second request of
the plaintiff's counsel, was not error: for he had already £harged
the same proposition in legal effect.
The first request of the plaintiff's counsel to charge the jury
was rightfully refused, because it was a proposition that the, sheriff
was bound to take more than ordinary care of the coal, and that
.f for the want of more thani ordinary care the same was lost, he
was responsible.
We have nothing to do with the question whether the verdict
of the jury was against evidence. The decision of the Court below
that it was not, is conclusive upon that point.

